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INTRODUCTION
During the 2012 Republican presidential primary campaign, an
interviewer asked candidate Herman Cain whether he supported a
constitutional amendment banning abortion:
Q:
CAIN:

Are you for some sort of pro-life amendment to the Constitution
that in essence would trump Roe v. Wade?
Yes. Yes, I feel that strongly about it. You know, if we can get the
necessary support and it comes to my desk, I’ll sign it. That’s all I
can do. I will sign it.1

Commentators were quick to derisively question Cain’s “grasp of the
Constitution” because the President is presumed to have no official role in
the constitutional amendment process.2 I contend that the former pizza
mogul’s “error” was perfectly understandable and his grasp of the
Constitution—at least, that of its plain text—is perfectly sound.
Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution
provides: “Every Bill . . . shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
President” for approval or veto.3 Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 extends the
presentment requirement to “[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote to which
1
Interview by David Brody with Herman Cain (Oct. 22, 2011) (emphases added), available at
http://youtu.be/uy_Kp6uBHQw?hd=1&t=59s (transcription by author); see also David Brody, Herman
Cain Exclusive: Tells Brody File He Will Support Constitutional Amendments on Life and Marriage,
BRODY FILE (Oct. 22, 2011, 10:13 PM), http://blogs.cbn.com/thebrodyfile/archive/2011/10/22/hermancain-exclusive-tells-brody-file-he-will-support-constitutional.aspx.
2
E.g., Ben Smith, Cain Would Autograph Life Amendment, POLITICO (Oct. 23, 2011, 12:51 PM),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/1011/Cain_would_autograph_life_amendment.html.
3
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be
necessary (except on a question of Adjournment).”4
Article V prescribes the method for amending the Constitution: “The
Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, . . . which . . . shall be
valid . . . when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof . . . .”5 Article V is silent
on whether amendment proposals must be presented to the President, and
in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, the Supreme Court—in a footnote—
summarily declared that the Presentment Clause does not apply to Article
V and the President has no formal role in the constitutional amendment
process.6 Predictably, Congress has embraced the President’s absence from
the Article V process, albeit with some inconsistency.7 Less predictably,
presidents, perhaps following the early example of George Washington,8
have acquiesced to this long-standing practice.9
I argue that the Presentment Clause does indeed apply to Article V
based on the text of the Constitution and the structure of our federal
government. Article I, Section 7 is clear that every bill, order, resolution,
and vote must be presented to the President, and Article V, like other
provisions calling for congressional action, makes no explicit exception to
this rule, thereby leaving the default presumption in place. And although
the Constitution requires Congress to muster a two-thirds majority in each
house to pass constitutional amendments (the same supermajority required
to override a presidential veto), vote tallies may change once the President
formally weighs in on the matter. In both the House and the Senate,
motions to override a presidential veto have in fact received different vote
tallies than the respective bills received upon initial passage.
I further argue that amendment proposals should be presented to the
President as a normative matter. Giving the President the power to veto
congressional legislation is an important structural protection that preserves
4

Id. cl. 3. I refer to Clauses 2 and 3 collectively as “the Presentment Clause.”
Id. art. V.
6
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 381 n.* (1798) (statement at oral argument of Chase, J.).
7
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 629–31 (1865) (Senate debate noting that President
Lincoln had signed the Thirteenth Amendment and adopting a resolution stating that presentment was
inadvertent and nonprecedential).
8
See George Washington, First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. 101-10, at 1, 4 (1989) (stating a desire to stay out of
the constitutional amendment process, being “guided by no lights derived from official opportunities”
to do so).
9
The only exceptions have been James Buchanan, who signed the Corwin Amendment (which
would have effectively legalized slavery in the United States), and Abraham Lincoln, who signed the
Thirteenth Amendment. See Herman V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States During the First Century of its History, in 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
HISTORICAL SOCIETY FOR THE YEAR 1896, at 3, 296 (1897).
5
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the checks and balances inherent in our federal government. Denying the
President this power over one of the most important congressional actions,
proposing constitutional amendments, undermines these checks and
balances. What is more, forcing the President to take an official stand on an
amendment can help clarify the debate and engage the nation, thereby
benefiting democracy.
Despite these textual and normative reasons why the Presentment
Clause must apply to Article V, history has decided the issue to the
contrary. I describe this history and show how the doctrine developed from
the time of the Framing until Reconstruction, when the issue was
definitively settled.
Requiring future amendment proposals to be presented to the President
is normatively desirable and would restore adherence to the Constitution’s
plain text. What makes it unpalatable, though, is the inevitable implication
that all of the previous twenty-seven amendments were unconstitutionally
adopted and therefore void. That is why I offer an approach to reinterpret
the Constitution so as to require presentment for future amendments while
saving all of the previously enacted ones. This approach is to broadly
construe “presentment” and “approval” to show that all twenty-seven
amendments have in fact been presented to and approved by the President.
My argument proceeds in five parts. I first review the history of the
amendment process in Part I, showing how all three branches of
government have to varying degrees advocated for or acquiesced in the
nonpresentment of constitutional amendment proposals. In Part II, I
analyze the text of the Constitution to conclude that the presentment
requirement of Article I, Section 7 indeed applies to the Article V
amendment process. I next argue in Part III that in addition to the textual
mandate, presentment of amendments is normatively desirable. In Part IV, I
present an interpretive approach in which presidential presentment may be
required for future amendments without affecting the constitutionality of
the existing twenty-seven.
I. A HISTORY OF NONPRESENTMENT
That the President has no role in the constitutional amendment process
is well settled. Perhaps it was settled in 1798 when Justice Chase
summarily declared during oral argument in Hollingsworth v. Virginia that
the President “has nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of
amendments to the Constitution.”10 Or maybe it was settled when Congress
neglected to seek President Washington’s signature on the Bill of Rights in
1789,11 or when the Senate explicitly disclaimed Congress’s presentment of
both the (failed) Corwin Amendment and the (eventually successful)
10
11
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Thirteenth Amendment to Presidents Buchanan and Lincoln, respectively.12
Surely it was settled when President Andrew Johnson, who actively
opposed the Fourteenth Amendment, accepted that he had no power to veto
it.13 In fact, it might have been settled at the very dawn of the Republic,
when President George Washington, in his first inaugural address, declined
even to recommend possible amendments because he would be “guided by
no lights derived from official opportunities” to do so.14 In short, all three
branches of government have advocated for or acquiesced in presidential
passivity in the amendment process. The Judicial and Legislative Branches
may have been driven by a degree of self-interest in their advocacy or
acquiescence; it is a little more difficult to understand what might have
motivated the Executive Branch to abdicate its constitutional authority.15 A
history lesson is in order.
A. The Judicial Branch: Hollingsworth v. Virginia
Hollingsworth v. Virginia16 was the final resolution of a land dispute
that began in the 1760s between a group of speculators and the state of
Virginia, which refused to recognize its claims for land in the Ohio
Valley.17 The speculators organized into a corporation (the Indiana
Company) in the 1770s18 and eventually filed suit against Virginia in 1792,
seeking $233,124.66 in damages, plus interest.19 Virginia’s governor,
Henry Lee, and its attorney general, James Innes, did not believe the suit
was authorized under Article III, under a theory of state sovereign
immunity.20 Indeed, Madison had assured the Virginia ratifying convention
that the proposed Constitution did not authorize such suits:
[The federal judiciary’s] jurisdiction in controversies between a state and
citizens of another state is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It
is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court. The only

12

See Ames, supra note 9, at 296.
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3349 (1866) (message from President Johnson to the
Senate).
14
Washington, supra note 8.
15
Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009) (1881) (“The
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”).
16
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
17
5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800:
SUITS AGAINST STATES 274 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
18
Id. at 276.
19
Id. at 282.
20
Id. at 282–83.
13
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operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring suit against a
citizen, it must be brought before the federal court.21

Madison was wrong: On February 18, 1793, the Supreme Court held
in Chisholm v. Georgia that citizens of another state could sue a state in
federal court, based on the plain language of Article III.22
Congress immediately reacted by proposing the Eleventh Amendment,
which explicitly forbids federal courts from hearing individual suits against
a state.23 The Amendment passed Congress on March 4, 1794, and the
requisite twelve states ratified it in less than a year.24 Curiously, the
Amendment’s status remained unclear until President John Adams issued a
proclamation on January 8, 1798 (nearly three years later) declaring: “This
Amendment, having been adopted by three fourths of the Several States,
may now be declared to be a Part of the Constitution of the United
States.”25
Meanwhile, the Hollingsworth case languished on the Supreme
Court’s docket, largely due to Virginia’s dilatory tactics.26 But once
President Adams made his January 1798 proclamation, Attorney General
Charles Lee asked the Supreme Court to rule on Hollingsworth’s
jurisdictional issue in the February 1798 Term.27 The Court heard oral
argument on February 10,28 where William Rawle, the attorney for the
Indiana Company, and William Tilghman, an attorney in a parallel case,
argued:
The [Eleventh] amendment has not been proposed in the form prescribed by
the Constitution, and, therefore, it is void. Upon an inspection of the original
roll, it appears that the amendment was never submitted to the President for
his approbation. . . . The concurrence of the President is required in matters
of infinitely less importance; and whether on subjects of ordinary legislation,

21

Statement of James Madison at the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 3 THE DEBATES IN
(Jonathan
Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 2d ed. 1891).
22
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 450 (1793) (opinion of Blair, J.) (“A dispute between
A. and B. is surely a dispute between B. and A. Both cases, I have no doubt, were intended” to be
covered by the Diversity Clause.).
23
U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
24
North Carolina ratified the amendment on February 7, 1795. 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 17, at 600–04 & n.35.
25
Id. at 604 & n.35.
26
See id. at 282–89.
27
Id. at 289.
28
1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 740–41 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971).
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533
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or of constitutional amendments, the expression is the same, and equally
applies to the act of both Houses of Congress.29

Justice Chase’s response was brief and conclusory:
There can, surely, be no necessity to answer that argument. The negative of
the President applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation: He has nothing
to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitution.30

Four days later,31 the Court issued a one-sentence opinion:
The Court, on the day succeeding the argument, delivered an unnanimous
[sic] opinion, that the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could
not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a state
was sued by the citizens of another state, or by citizens, or subjects, of any
foreign state.32

The Court dismissed the case, along with two others on its docket, all of
which involved individual suits against states.33
The holding of Hollingsworth is squarely on point. Yet nowhere does
the opinion reveal why the President “has nothing to do” with the
amendment process.34 Justice Chase did not even care for Attorney General
Lee to respond to the Indiana Company’s assertion: there was “no necessity
to answer that argument.”35 So although Hollingsworth clearly holds that
presentment is not required for amendment proposals, it is little more than
an ipse dixit and thus of questionable precedential value.36
What is more, the Hollingsworth Court was undoubtedly motivated at
least in part by pure self-interest. The Court’s decision in Chisholm
29
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 379 (1798) (argument of W. Tilghman &
Rawle).
30
Id. at 381 n.* (statement at oral argument of Chase, J.).
31
GOEBEL, supra note 28, at 741 n.87 (“The minutes of the Court indicate that on Feb. 10, 1798,
the argument was heard without reference to any pending cause. The entries for Feb. 14, 1798, start
with Hollingsworth . . . .”). Curiously, Alexander Dallas reported that the Court issued its opinion “on
the day succeeding the argument.” Hollingsworth, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 382. No reason is given for this
discrepancy.
32
Hollingsworth, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 382.
33
5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 17, at 604 & n.36.
34
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 381 n.*.
35
Id. After rhetorically asking, “But has not the same course been pursued relative to all the other
amendments, that have been adopted?,” Attorney General Lee did respond nonetheless: “And the case
of amendments is evidently a substantive act, unconnected with the ordinary business of legislation, and
not within the policy, or terms, of investing the President with a qualified negative on the acts and
resolutions of Congress.” Id. at 381.
36
This is not to diminish Hollingsworth’s place in history: at least one renowned commentator has
argued that it, and not the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was the
first instance of judicial review. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, at 22 (1985) (“Hollingsworth may put to flight the conventional
wisdom that Marbury v. Madison was the first case in which the Supreme Court held an act of Congress
unconstitutional.”).
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triggered a swift and immediate backlash at a time when the federal
judiciary was a fledgling branch of government with far less power than the
other two branches.37 The Eleventh Amendment was squarely addressed at
overturning the decision in Chisholm,38 and for the Court to hold the
Amendment unconstitutional would have been politically impossible.39 The
issue of presentment simply could not be extricated from the hot-button
issue of state sovereign immunity; not surprisingly, political expediency
won the day.
Although the Court has never bolstered Hollingsworth’s reasoning, it
has restated its rule on a few occasions.40 From the judicial perspective, the
issue is thus settled law.
B. The Legislative Branch: An Inconsistent History
Congress has also concluded that constitutional amendment proposals
need not be presented to the President. Although this result is predictable—
it aggrandizes Congress by granting it unchecked power to propose
amendments without interference from the Executive Branch—not every
Congress has reached this conclusion.
Congress did not seek President Washington’s explicit approval or
signature for the Bill of Rights; instead, the House merely requested that he
send all twelve amendments to the states for ratification:
On motion, it was resolved, that the President of the United States be
requested to transmit to the Executives of the several States which have
ratified the Constitution, copies of the amendments proposed by Congress, to
be added thereto, and like copies to the Executives of the States of Rhode
Island and North Carolina.41

Congress followed a similar practice with what became the Eleventh42
and Twelfth43 Amendments, as well as with a failed amendment proposal
37
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“[T]he
judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power . . . .”).
38
See MARTIN H. REDISH, SUZANNA SHERRY & JAMES E. PFANDER, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES,
COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 368 (7th ed. 2012); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 334 (2005) (“The Chisholm decision provoked widespread resentment,
culminating in an amendment designed to overrule the Court.”).
39
See Charles L. Black, Jr., Correspondence, On Article I, Section 7, Clause 3—and the
Amendment of the Constitution, 87 YALE L.J. 896, 898 n.11 (1978) (“It should be noted that this case
was decided literally overnight, and that it is hard to imagine greater pressure on the Supreme Court
than existed with respect to validating the Eleventh Amendment, which had been passed to correct its
own universally resented decision in Chisholm . . . .”).
40
See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955–56 n.21 (1983) (recognizing the holding of
Hollingsworth as valid and stating that presentment does not apply to the Article V process); Hawke v.
Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 229–30 (1920) (same).
41
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 913–14 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (recording the debate in the House
on Sept. 24, 1789).
42
See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 65 (1794).
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banning titles of nobility.44 In fact, in the case of the Twelfth Amendment,
“[a] motion in the Senate to submit the amendment to the President for
approval was rejected by the decisive vote of 7 to 23.”45
Yet in 1861, Congress presented the Corwin Amendment to the
President. The Corwin Amendment would have enshrined slavery in the
Constitution46:
No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or
give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the
domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or
service by the laws of said State.47

Fearful that President-elect Lincoln would disapprove of this
Amendment, President Buchanan signed it in the waning hours of his
Administration.48 Buchanan’s fears were unfounded; Lincoln endorsed the
Amendment’s validity in his inaugural address:
I understand a proposed amendment to the Constitution, which amendment,
however, I have not seen, has passed Congress, to the effect that the federal
government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States,
including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I
have said, I depart from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments,
so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied
Constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express, and
irrevocable.49

The Corwin Amendment was not ratified by the requisite number of
states before the Civil War intervened, mooting the issue.50 Four years later,
Congress passed what would ultimately become the Thirteenth Amendment
43

See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 214 (1803).
See 21 ANNALS OF CONG. 2050–51 (1810) (recording only the passage of the amendment, with
no further action before adjournment). The amendment was ratified by twelve states. See DAVID C.
HUCKABEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-922 GOV, RATIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 5 (1997).
45
Ames, supra note 9.
46
Thomas Corwin was a Republican Congressman and former Whig Senator from Ohio. Corwin,
Thomas, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/
scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000791 (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
47
ROBERT BRADY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMENDED, H.R. DOC. NO. 11050, at 30 (2007). Corwin proposed the amendment in the House on February 27, 1861, but it was
defeated 123–71. See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1264 (1861). (Oddly, the House Journal lists
the vote as 120–71. See 57 H.R. JOURNAL, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 416–21 (1861).) The House passed it
the next day 133–65, CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1284–85 (1861), and the Senate passed it on
March 2, 24–12, id. at 1402–03. President Buchanan signed it the same day. Id. at 1408.
48
See ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 2 (2004).
49
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address 7 (Mar. 4, 1861), available at http://www.loc.gov/
exhibits/treasures/trt039.html.
50
See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,
1776–1995, at 150–51 (1996).
44
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and again presented it to the President for his signature.51 Although
President Lincoln signed it, the Senate, on the motion of Senator
Trumbull,52 immediately adopted a resolution disclaiming the presentment
as “inadvertent” and nonprecedential.53
Senator Howe54 objected to Trumbull’s characterization, pointing out
that the Corwin Amendment already set the precedent for presentment of
amendments, even if the amendment was not ultimately ratified by the
states.55 Howe also forcefully argued in favor of presentment, presaging
some of the arguments made in Parts II and III, infra. Most significantly,
Howe noted that “presentment” occurred by simple virtue of sending
copies of amendment proposals to the President for transmittal to the
various states. So the precedent that had been set was actually to present
amendments to the President, and not to bypass presentment. Nevertheless,
the Senate adopted Trumbull’s resolution,56 although no record exists of the
House adopting a similar resolution.57
Oddly, even after this debate, Congress presented the Fifteenth
Amendment to the President. The Fifteenth Amendment passed both
houses of Congress by the required two-thirds majorities on February 26,
1869.58 On that date, the Senate Journal records that the House approved
“an enrolled joint resolution (S.8) and an enrolled bill, (H.R. 1812[]).”59 S.8
was the “[j]oint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States.”60 The next entry in the Journal reads: “The President pro
tempore signed the enrolled bill (H.R. 1812) and the enrolled joint
resolution (S.8) last reported to have been examined, and they were
delivered to the committee to be presented to the President of the United
States.”61

51

See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 629–31 (1865) (Senate debate noting that President
Lincoln had signed the Thirteenth Amendment).
52
Lyman Trumbull was the senior Senator from Illinois and the author of the Thirteenth
Amendment. See HORACE WHITE, THE LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL 224 (1913).
53
See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 629–31 (1865).
54
Timothy O. Howe was a Radical Republican from Wisconsin. He was on President Grant’s short
list to replace Chief Justice Chase but ultimately remained in the Senate and eventually served as
Postmaster General under President Arthur. See William H. Russell, Timothy O. Howe, Stalwart
Republican, 35 WIS. MAG. HIST. 90, 90–99 (1951).
55
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 630 (1865).
56
Id. at 631.
57
See 62 H.R. JOURNAL, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1865) (noting only that the Senate adopted a
resolution requesting the President to transmit copies of the Thirteenth Amendment to the states for
ratification but making no mention of Trumbull’s resolution disclaiming the presentment requirement).
58
See HUCKABEE, supra note 44, at 4 (table entry listing the Fifteenth Amendment as having been
proposed on February 26, 1869).
59
36 S. JOURNAL, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 361 (1869).
60
Id. at 362.
61
Id. (emphases added).
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The word “they” clearly means that both the bill and the joint
resolution—that is, the proposed constitutional amendment—were
delivered to be presented to the President. No record exists of President
Johnson signing the Fifteenth Amendment before distributing it to the
various states for ratification.62 But this entry in the Journal of the Senate
shows that even after the heated and seemingly decisive debate of February
1865, Congress continued to display inconsistency in its presentment
practice.63
C. The Executive Branch: Presidential Acquiescence
As noted above, President Buchanan signed the Corwin Amendment,
and President Lincoln signed the Thirteenth. Both Presidents evidently felt
they were constitutionally permitted (if not required) to do so. That said,
these are the only two exceptions to the general rule that presidents do not
play an active role in the amendment process.
Like many presidential practices, this behavior can be traced to George
Washington. In his first inaugural address, Washington forswore any
involvement with constitutional amendments:
Besides the ordinary objects submitted to your care, it will remain with
your judgment to decide how far an exercise of the occasional power
delegated by the fifth article of the Constitution is rendered expedient at the
present juncture by the nature of objections which have been urged against
the system, or by the degree of inquietude which has given birth to them.
Instead of undertaking particular recommendations on this subject, in which
I could be guided by no lights derived from official opportunities, I shall
again give way to my entire confidence in your discernment and pursuit of
the public good . . . .64

Believing he had no “official opportunities” to weigh in on
constitutional amendments, Washington gave Congress his “entire
confidence” in the matter.65 Given such ex ante deference to Congress,
Washington unsurprisingly signed neither the Bill of Rights nor the
Eleventh Amendment, which was also proposed during his tenure.66
Other presidents followed Washington’s lead. President John Quincy
Adams, for example, “refused to recommend an amendment in regard to
62

President Johnson must have acted swiftly to distribute the amendment; on March 1, 1869, just
three days after Congress passed the joint resolution proposing the amendment, Nevada became the first
state to ratify it. ROBERT BRADY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMENDED, H.R. DOC.
NO. 110-50, at 18 (2007).
63
There is no evidence in the Senate or House Journals to indicate that any future amendments—
that is, the Sixteenth through the Twenty-Sixth Amendments—were sent to the President explicitly for
the purpose of approval rather than merely for the purpose of transmittal to the states.
64
Washington, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
65
Id.
66
See KYVIG, supra note 50, at 105, 113; see also supra note 42.
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the election of President” because he did not believe the President had any
role to play in the constitutional amendment process.67 Adams also advised
President Monroe (in whose administration he served as Secretary of State)
not to propose an amendment in 1817.68 Even here, though, the record is
mixed—John Quincy Adams was one of the seven Senators (against the
“decisive” majority of twenty-three) who voted in favor of presenting the
Twelfth Amendment to the President for his approval in 1803.69
But neither George Washington’s nor John Quincy Adams’s belated
deference to Congress can explain the actions of Andrew Johnson, whose
immediate predecessors (Lincoln and Buchanan) both signed constitutional
amendments.70 Johnson was no fan of the Fourteenth Amendment and
actively worked to defeat its ratification.71 And yet he did not veto it.72
President Johnson assumed he lacked the power to do so, and although he
dutifully forwarded the Amendment to the states for ratification, he
pointedly denied that he approved of it:
Waiving the question as to the constitutional validity of the proceedings of
Congress upon the joint resolution proposing the amendment, or as to the
merits of the article which it submits, through the executive department, to
the Legislatures of the States, I deem it proper to observe that the steps taken
by the Secretary of State, as detailed in the accompanying report, are to be
considered as purely ministerial, and in no sense whatever committing the
Executive to an approval or a recommendation of the amendment to the
State Legislatures or to the people.73

President Johnson’s view of the executive role as merely “ministerial”
has survived. All subsequent presidents have dutifully performed the
ministerial role of forwarding proposed amendments to the states for
ratification without officially expressing approval or disapproval.74
67

See Ames, supra note 9.
Id.
69
See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 630 (1865) (Sen. Howe) (noting John Quincy Adams’s
1803 vote).
70
See supra Part I.B.
71
See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Referendum of 1866: Andrew Johnson and the
Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause (Aug. 6, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125363 (describing Johnson’s
opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment and his efforts to defeat it, including by proposing an
alternative).
72
Although he did not veto the Fourteenth Amendment, President Johnson vetoed (and Congress
overrode his vetoes on) all four Reconstruction Acts. See PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, 1789–1988, S. Pub.
102-12, at 33–34 (1992) (listing vetoes and overrides of H.R. 1143, H.R. 33, H.R. 123, and H.J. Res.
71).
73
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3349 (1866) (emphasis added).
74
Interestingly, the first amendment ratified after Reconstruction, the Sixteenth Amendment, was
proposed by President Taft himself. William Howard Taft, Message Concerning Tax on Net Income of
Corporations, Address Before Congress (June 16, 1909), in 1 PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE
PAPERS OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 166, 167 (1910) (“I therefore recommend to the Congress that both
68
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT MANDATES PRESENTMENT
Despite all three branches of government acquiescing in the exemption
of constitutional amendment proposals from presentment, the text of the
Constitution admits no such exemption. The Presentment Clause applies to
“[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote,”75 and Article V’s silence cannot
create an implied exception to this unambiguous rule.
A. Deconstructing Article I, Section 7
As with any constitutional issue, the first place to look is the text.76
Article I defines the powers and limitations of the Legislative Branch, and
Section 7 defines the legislative process.77 The relevant part of the second
clause reads:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with
his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall
enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If
after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the
Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that
House, it shall become a Law. . . . If any Bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in
which Case it shall not be a Law.78

Clause 2 defines the process of congressional lawmaking and
describes the steps that “[e]very [b]ill” passing both houses of Congress
must take before becoming law. First, Clause 2 requires the bill to “be
presented to the President of the United States.”79 As discussed in Part IV,
infra, the word “presented” is not defined anywhere in the Constitution.
Next, the President must act: “If he approve he shall sign it . . . .”80 So
disregarding the exceptions to be discussed shortly, a bill cannot become a
Houses, by a two-thirds vote, shall propose an amendment to the Constitution conferring the power to
levy an income tax upon the National Government without apportionment among the States in
proportion to population.”).
75
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
76
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (noting that constitutional interpretation, like statutory interpretation, should
rely on “the original meaning of the text”). The text is often the last place to look as well.
77
The first clause of Section 7 deals with revenue bills and is inapposite to the presentment issue. It
reads: “All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may
propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
78
Id. cl. 2.
79
Id.
80
Id.
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law unless the President signs it, presumably by scrawling on whatever
copy of the bill Congress “presented” to him. Conversely, if the President
does not “approve” of the bill, “he shall return it, with his Objections to
that House in which it shall have originated.”81 Clause 2 thus imposes a
duty on the President to return his copy of the presented bill, along with a
list of his “Objections” to it, if he does not “approve” of the bill. Again,
none of these terms—“presented,” “approve,” “sign,” “return”—are
explicitly defined in the Constitution.
The rest of Clause 2 describes the two ways in which a bill can
become law even absent the President’s signature. First, Congress may
override a presidential veto (by a two-thirds vote in each house). Second, if
the President neither signs nor returns the bill within ten days of
presentment—and Congress remains in session throughout this time—it
automatically becomes law. But if Congress adjourns in the interim, the
President’s inaction is a “pocket veto” and the bill does not become law
(unless Congress overrides it, just as with a traditional veto).82 The
importance of these procedures will become evident when evaluating
previously enacted amendments, as described in Part IV, infra.
Clause 3 in its entirety reads:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House
of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the
Case of a Bill.83

Clause 3 seems to do no more than extend Clause 2’s requirement for bills
to orders, resolutions, and votes (except for motions to adjourn), so that
Congress cannot evade the presentment requirement by labeling its actions
“resolutions” instead of “bills.” Indeed, this was likely the Framers’ intent
in drafting Clause 3. James Madison recorded the following debate during
the Philadelphia Convention of 1787:
Mr. MADISON, observing that if the negative of the President was confined
to bills; it would be evaded by acts under the form and name of Resolutions,
votes &c, proposed that [“]or resolve” should be added after “bill” in the
beginning of sect 13. with an exception as to votes of adjournment &c.—
after a short and rather confused conversation on the subject, the question
was put & rejected . . . .84

81

Id.
See id.; see also The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 676–77 (1929) (defining the term).
83
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
84
JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 465 (Adrienne
Koch ed., 1966) (debate of Aug. 15, 1787).
82
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Madison wanted to modify the language of Clause 2 to ensure that
resolutions, votes, and other actions of Congress would also be subject to
the same presentment requirement as bills. Interestingly, as Madison noted,
“the question was put [and] rejected” 8–3.85 That is Madison’s last entry on
August 15. His first entry on August 16 reads:
Mr. RANDOLPH having thrown into a new form the motion, putting votes,
Resolutions &c. on a footing with Bills, renewed it as follows “Every order
resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate & House of Reps.
may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment and in the cases
hereinafter mentioned) shall be presented to the President for his revision;
and before the same shall have force shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him shall be repassed by the Senate & House of Reps.
according to the rules & limitations prescribed in the case of a Bill.”86

This time, the motion passed 9–1. No evidence exists to explain why
Madison’s proposal was soundly rejected while Randolph’s was easily
adopted, or to explain what transpired during the “short and rather confused
conversation on the subject” on August 15.87 All the same, the plain text
(and common sense) reasonably suggests that Clause 3’s intent was to
ensure that Congress did not evade Clause 2’s strictures simply by
relabeling its actions.88 Taken together, Clauses 2 and 3 stand for the clear
rule that all bicameral actions (except motions to adjourn) require
presentment.89
Three distinct features of Clause 3 are worth highlighting. First,
Clause 3 requires that orders, resolutions, and votes, after being presented,
“shall be approved by” the President before they take effect.90 But nowhere
does Clause 3 require the President to actually sign them. So while a bill
needs presidential signature to become law, an order, resolution, or vote
does not.91
85

Id.
Id. at 466 (Aug. 16, 1787).
87
Id. at 465 (Aug. 15, 1787).
88
But see Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why
Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1314 (2005) (arguing that Randolph’s proposal could not have meant the same
thing as Madison’s because otherwise seven states would not have changed their votes and because
Convention rules did not permit a defeated motion to be reconsidered without one day’s notice).
89
See Antonin Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload, REGULATION,
Nov./Dec. 1979, at 19, 20 (“The purpose of [Art. I, § 7, cl. 3], as confirmed by accounts of the debate at
the Constitutional Convention, is to prevent Congress from evading the President’s legislative role (as
some state legislatures before 1789 had evaded gubernatorial veto powers) by simply acting through
measures that are not called ‘bills.’ It was meant to ensure presidential participation in all lawmaking,
under whatever form it might disguise itself.”).
90
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
91
That, at least, is the most straightforward reading of the text. Cf. Tillman, supra note 88, at 1319,
1321 (rhetorically pointing this out but limiting the scope of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 to singlehouse actions). For more detail on Professor Tillman’s interpretation of Clause 3, see infra note 114.
86
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Second, if the President disapproves of an order, resolution, or vote, a
two-thirds majority in each house is required to override his veto
“according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.”92
Here, Clause 3 specifically incorporates the rules from Clause 2—but only
for the case of presidential disapproval. So while the President need not
actually sign the order, resolution, or vote if he approves of it, the President
must actually return it to the house of origin, describing his objections, if he
disapproves of it. In addition, the ten-day limit for such a return would
apply because this limit is one of the “Rules and Limitations prescribed in
the Case of a Bill.”
Third, Clause 3 specifically lists an exception to the presentment
requirement: questions of adjournment.93 Why the Framers chose to include
this particular exception is beyond the scope here,94 but by listing an
exception, the Framers must have intended this to be the only exception.95
All in all, Clauses 2 and 3 tell us three things. First, all bicameral
actions of Congress require presentment; there are no exceptions (other
than votes to adjourn), and this was the Framers’ intent. Second, only bills
need to be signed to take effect;96 orders, resolutions, and votes need only
be approved by the President but not necessarily signed. Third, if the
President disapproves of a bill, order, resolution, or vote, he must take the
active step of returning it to Congress within ten days of presentment (if
Congress remains in session); otherwise, it becomes law.
B. The Deafening Silence of Article V
Article V specifies the manner in which the Constitution may be
amended:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents
and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures
of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress . . . .97

Article V offers two methods for amendments to be proposed for
adoption and two methods for amendments to be ratified; either method of
92

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
See id.
94
For one take on the issue, see Tillman, supra note 88, at 1346–49.
95
See J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 325, at 410 (1st ed. 1891)
(describing the interpretative canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
96
Ignoring, for the moment, instances where the President fails to take action within the ten-day
window and Congress remains in session. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
97
U.S. CONST. art. V.
93
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proposal may be combined with either method of ratification. The first
method for proposing amendments is for two-thirds of both houses of
Congress to pass the proposed constitutional amendment. The other method
is for a constitutional convention to propose amendments. Only Congress
can call this convention, and only after the legislatures of two-thirds of the
states tell it to do so.98 Either way, Congress is involved—it proposes the
amendments or it calls a convention for that purpose. All of the
Constitution’s amendments have traveled the first route: Congress
proposed them with two-thirds majorities in each house. The convention
option has never been tried.99
Article V is silent on presidential involvement in the amendment
process. Although Congress features prominently, no mention whatsoever
is made of the President. What to make of the silence of Article V? Does its
failure to mention presentment mean that amendments need not be
presented to the President? Or does its silence imply that the default,
background rule—presentment—continues to apply?
C. Article I, Section 7 Applies to Article V
Article V’s silence cannot create an exception to the clear mandate of
the Presentment Clause. Such an argument would, contrary to the text, treat
the congressional powers in Article V as different from those in the rest of
the Constitution, which are not granted such an exception. That the vote
tally required to pass an amendment is the same as that required to override
a presidential veto is also not sufficient to create such an implied exception
to presentment. Similarly, the fact that amendments proposed by the
(unused) convention method need not be presented to the President does
not confer the same latitude on amendments proposed by Congress. To be
sure, implied exceptions do exist in the Constitution, but the Article V
amendment process is normatively different from these cases. Each of these
arguments is taken up in detail below.
1. The Plain Text.—Granting Article V an implied exception from
the presentment requirement is an argument that proves too much.
Presentment is only mentioned in Article I, Section 7; every other
congressional power is listed without mention of presentment. If Article
V’s silence is read to create an implied exception to the presentment
98
Note that Congress “shall” call a convention upon application by the requisite number of state
legislatures; that is, Congress must call the convention. Id.
99
See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Rules
Governing the Process, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693, 709 (2011) (“[A] convention for proposing amendments
has never been held . . . .”). Nor has the convention option for ratification been used, as expected even
early on. See, e.g., ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 1:App. 371–72 (1803),
reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 583 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)
(“The latter will probably never be resorted to, unless the federal government should betray symptoms
of corruption . . . .”).
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requirement, then by that logic every congressional power granted in the
Constitution would also enjoy an implied exception from presentment.
That, of course, is nonsense. Congress has always presented to the
President bills and resolutions passed pursuant to its powers granted in
Article I,100 Article II,101 Article III,102 and Article IV.103 There is no textual
reason why Article V should be any different. Article I, Section 7 functions
as a background rule for all bicameral congressional action (except for
adjournment), and only an express exception (such as the one for
adjournment) can overcome the strong presumption in favor of
presentment.
Another textual objection might be that Article V only calls on
Congress to “propose” amendments and thus falls outside of the scope of
bills, orders, resolutions, or votes.104 But Congress is also empowered with
“dipos[ing] of” territories or property,105 “declar[ing] the Punishment of
Treason,”106 “[c]onsent[ing]” to various state actions,107 and “ordain[ing]
and establish[ing]” inferior federal courts,108 among other powers.109 All of
these are textual directives to Congress that have never been understood to
fall outside of the legislative process defined by Article I. Congress’s
“propos[al]” of amendments must similarly fall under its rubric. At any
rate, constitutional amendments are adopted as joint resolutions of the
100
For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, passed pursuant to Congress’s
Article I, Section 8 tax power, was presented to and signed by President Obama. See Sheryl Gay
Stolberg & Robert Pear, A Stroke of a Pen, Make that 20, and It’s Official, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010,
at A19.
101
For example, Congress directs Electoral College members to meet “on the first Monday after
the second Wednesday in December” following a presidential election. See 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
Congress’s power to do so derives from Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 (“The Congress may determine
the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be
the same throughout the United States.”). 3 U.S.C. § 7 was originally enacted in codified form as H.R.
6412, 80th Cong. (1948). See 62 Stat. 672–73 (1948). It was presented to the President on June 21,
1948, and was signed by him on June 25. See 94 CONG. REC. 9365 (1948) (indicating presentment of
H.R. 6412 on June 21); id. at 9365, 9367 (message from the President indicating that he signed it on
June 25).
102
For example, the Judiciary Act of 1789 (“An act to regulate processes in the courts of the
United States.”), regulating the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts pursuant
to Article III, Section 2, was presented to the President on September 28, 1789, and recorded as signed
by him on September 29. S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 91–93 (1789).
103
For example, “[n]ew States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.” U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 3. On December 3, 1818, Congress presented to the President a “resolution declaring the
admission of the state of Illinois into the Union,” and President Monroe signed it that same day. H.R.
JOURNAL, 15th Cong., 2d Sess. 60–61 (1818).
104
U.S. CONST. art. V; see also id. art. I, § 7.
105
Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
106
Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
107
Id. art. I, § 10.
108
Id. art. III, § 1.
109
See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8.
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House and Senate,110 squarely placing them within the express language of
Clause 3.111
The fact that Article V comes after Article I is also not enough to
create an implicit exception. This argument again proves too much, for
almost all of Congress’s powers are listed after Article I, Section 7 (the vast
majority are in Section 8). What is more, Article I and Article V were
drafted contemporaneously and are thus appropriately read as a unified
whole in harmony with each other.112 This is distinguished from the case of
a constitutional amendment, which might reasonably be thought to modify
all antecedent clauses to the contrary.113 Therefore, Article V cannot
constitute a later modification of, or implied exception to, the requirements
of Article I.
A final potential argument against applying the Presentment Clause to
Article V is that, despite its clear language, Article I, Section 7, Clause 3
actually refers only to orders, resolutions, and votes of a single house of
Congress acting pursuant to a prior bicameral authorization of the
subsequent single-house action.114 While creative and thought provoking,
110
See The Constitutional Amendment Process, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/
federal-register/constitution (“The Congress proposes an amendment in the form of a joint resolution.”)
(last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
111
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 767 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“[A] joint
resolution . . . by definition must be passed by both Houses and signed by the President.”).
112
By contrast, the First Congress specifically rejected Madison’s proposal to interweave the text
of subsequent amendments into the body of the Constitution, preferring to append them to the end of
the document. See AMAR, supra note 38, at 458–59.
113
For example, the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments are implicitly thought to have
broadened the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections, despite the former never explicitly
referring to the latter. See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX; cf. id. amend. XIV. Similarly, the Fourteenth
Amendment is thought to have created an implicit exception to the Eleventh Amendment, allowing
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Section 5 powers. See Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty
which it embodies, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
114
See Tillman, supra note 88, at 1321. Professor Tillman’s complicated thesis requires some
explanation. Characterizing the language of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 as “needlessly syntactically
complex and elliptical,” Professor Tillman concludes that it must have a meaning other than its plain
one. Id. at 1318; see also id. at 1317–21 (listing five other reasons for seeking a different meaning).
After querying parliamentary scholars, Professor Tillman decided that the correct reading of Article I,
Section 7, Clause 3 is:
Every [final] Order, Resolution, or Vote [of a single house] to which the [prior] Concurrence
of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary [as bicameral congressional
authorization for subsequent single-house action] . . . shall be presented to the President [so that
his veto might act upon the subsequent single-house action just as it acted upon the prior
authorizing legislation] . . . and before the same [subsequent single-house action] shall take
Effect [in conformity with the prior authorizing legislation], shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Id. at 1321 (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3). Under this interpretation,
Clause 3 does not apply to constitutional amendments at all because amendments proposed by Congress
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this argument is wholly unsupported by the Constitution’s plain text,
Madison’s notes, or any other contemporaneous discussion of the Clause.
Indeed, the argument amounts to pure speculation, perhaps “the work of an
overactive imagination.”115
2. The Two-Thirds Requirement.—A two-thirds vote in each house
is necessary to pass an amendment—the same supermajority required to
override a presidential veto.116 Thus, one might argue, a proposed
amendment need not be presented to the President because it has already
been passed by a vote sufficient to override a potential veto.117 This
superficially appealing argument breaks down for two reasons. First, such
an argument based on principles of expediency proves too much: by this
logic, if a regular piece of legislation happens to pass by a two-thirds
majority in each house, would it, too, not be subject to the presentment
requirement? Such a conclusion would be patently unconstitutional, despite
the gains in efficiency that would come from avoiding a presidential veto
(and subsequent votes to override it in both houses).118 Constitutionally
mandated steps may not be skipped for expediency’s sake.
Second, even though an amendment has already garnered a two-thirds
majority in each house, there is no guarantee that it would continue to
garner the same majority after a presidential veto.119 Vote tallies often
change once the President has officially weighed in on a matter; indeed,
vote tallies have almost always changed after a presidential veto. For
example, President Obama vetoed H.J. Res. 64 on December 30, 2009, and
H.R. 3808 on October 8, 2010.120 In the House, the votes to override these
bills were 143–245 and 185–235, respectively.121 Not only did the votes to
override President Obama’s vetoes for each of these two bills fail to reach
the required two-thirds majorities, they failed to command even simple
majorities, despite having originally cleared the House by voice votes

pursuant to Article V are not the result of single-house actions taken pursuant to a prior bicameral
authorization for such action. Professor Tillman thus believes that Hollingsworth v. Virginia was
correctly decided, though not for reasons articulated by the Court (or by anyone else). See id. at 1364–
66.
115
Id. at 1331 (conceding the audacity and novelty of this interpretation).
116
Compare U.S. CONST. art. V (providing for the proposal of an amendment through the vote of
two-thirds of both houses of Congress), with id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring the vote of two-thirds of both
houses of Congress for a bill vetoed by the President to become law).
117
See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 38, at 594–95 n.7.
118
Removing the President’s ability to “carefully examine and consider a bill and determine, after
due deliberation, whether he should approve or disapprove it” violates the separation of powers. The
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 677 (1929).
119
Senator Howe made this very argument in 1865. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 631
(1865) (statement of Sen. Howe) (noting that vote tallies can change after a presidential veto).
120
See Vetoes by President Barack H. Obama, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
Legislation/Vetoes/ObamaBH.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
121
See id.
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(generally reserved for bills with little or no opposition) and the Senate by
unanimous consent (same).122 It is reasonable to conclude that the
presidential veto had an impact on the override vote tallies.
For a bill with support at or near the two-thirds threshold, the
influence of a presidential veto can be dispositive.123 Presidential vetoes
need not always influence the vote tally downwards; political forces may
conspire to move the votes in either direction.124 An official presidential
veto can influence the vote tallies in Congress, upwards or downwards,
even when the votes are taken just days apart. In fact, an analysis of every
presidential veto from 1993 to the present reveals that the vote tallies
before and after the veto are almost never the same.125 So just because a
122

See Bill Summary & Status, H.J. Res. 64, LIBRARY OF CONG. THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HJ00064:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 6, 2013); Bill Summary &
Status, H.R. 3808, LIBRARY OF CONG. THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:
HR03808:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
123
For example, on August 31, 2000, President Clinton vetoed H.R. 8, the Death Tax Elimination
Act of 2000. Although the bill initially passed the House by a vote of 279–136 (larger than a two-thirds
majority), it failed a vote to override in the House by a vote of 274–157 (only a 63.6% majority, less
than the required 66.7%). See PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, 1989–2000, S. PUB. 107–10, at 22–23 (2001),
available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/presvetoes.pdf; Bill Summary & Status,
H.R. 8, LIBRARY OF CONG. THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:HR00008:@@@L
&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
Sixteen more congressmen cast votes the second time around, but, curiously, most of them were
Republicans who voted in favor of overriding the veto. Despite this, the number of votes in support of
the bill dropped from 279 to 274, largely because only 53 Democrats voted to override President
Clinton’s veto (compared to 65 Democrats who originally voted for the bill). See Final Vote Results for
Roll Call 254, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2000/roll254.xml (last visited Jan. 6,
2013) (recording original House vote on H.R. 8); Final Vote Results for Roll Call 458, OFFICE OF THE
CLERK, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2000/roll458.xml (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) (recording final House
vote on H.R. 8 in response to veto). Although President Clinton’s veto caused his political opponents to
turn out in greater force against him, it simultaneously influenced his political allies to switch their
votes and join his camp. Note that H.R. 8 originally passed the Senate by a vote of 59–39 (less than a
two-thirds majority), Bill Summary & Status, H.R. 8, supra, and so the veto likely would have been
sustained even had the House successfully overridden it.
124
For example, President Clinton vetoed H.R. 4733, the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act of 2001, on October 7, 2000. PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, 1989–2000, S. PUB. 107–10,
at 23 (2001), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/presvetoes.pdf. The measure
had originally passed the House just over a week earlier, on September 28, by a vote of 301–118. Bill
Summary & Status, H.R. 4733, LIBRARY OF CONG. THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d106:HR04733:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). On October 11, the House voted to
override President Clinton’s veto by a vote of 315–98. Id. Interestingly, while 44 Republicans voted
against the bill initially, 13 days later only 28 Republicans voted to sustain the veto. See Final Vote
Results for Roll Call 501, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2000/roll501.xml (last
visited Jan. 6, 2013); Final Vote Results for Roll Call 523, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, http://clerk.house.
gov/evs/2000/roll523.xml (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). President Clinton’s veto again caused his political
adversaries to abandon his camp, without a comparable countervailing impact on his political allies.
125
Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have vetoed a total of fifty-one bills. Of these, the House
passed seven by a voice vote and failed to hold override votes on twenty-two more. Of the twenty-two
remaining bills, only once did the vote tally to override exactly match the original vote tally—the
Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 1997, H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. (enacted over a presidential veto). Thirteen
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proposed amendment might have originally passed both houses by twothirds majorities does not necessarily mean that it would continue to garner
that same level of support after a presidential veto. The two-thirds
requirement is thus nothing but a counterfactual smokescreen that should
not obscure the presentment requirement.
3. The Convention Method.—Another objection to the clear textual
mandate is that because a constitutional convention would not need to
present its amendment proposals to the President, so too should Congress
be free from having to present its amendment proposals.126 This argument
from symmetry is unconvincing because—somewhat tautologically—the
amendment methods are dissimilar. First, the Presentment Clause does not
apply to the proceedings of a constitutional convention composed of state
delegations because the convention’s actions are not bicameral actions of
Congress.127 So the fact that the convention enjoys immunity from
presentment does not imply that Congress does too.
More importantly, this argument from symmetry proves too much.
The Constitution explicitly calls for congressionally proposed amendments
to pass by a two-thirds supermajority in each house. But Article V is silent
on what fraction of convention delegates must vote for amendment
proposals before they may be passed along to the state legislatures (or
conventions). The argument from symmetry would suggest that a
convention, too, must pass amendments by a two-thirds majority. But that

bills saw lower support on their respective override votes, losing an average of roughly seven yea votes
and gaining over four nay votes. The votes to override eight other bills, by contrast, gained an average
of nearly ten yea votes and lost an average of over five nay votes.
In the Senate, nine of the fifty-one vetoed bills originally passed by voice vote or unanimous
consent, and thirty-five more never had an override vote. Of the seven remaining bills, one had exactly
the same override vote total as the original vote (the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997). Another
bill, the Water Resources Development Act of 2007, H.R. 1495, 110th Cong., lost two yea votes and
gained two nay votes. The remaining five bills gained Senate support on the override vote, gaining an
average of over one yea vote and losing an average of one-half nay votes.
A spreadsheet containing all of the relevant data above is on file with the Northwestern University
Law Review. The data were compiled from information available at Bills, Resolutions, LIBRARY OF
CONG. THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills_res.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) (click on “Browse
Bills & Resolutions”; then select the appropriate congressional session; then click on “Bill Number”;
then select the appropriate bill number). The list of bills vetoed by the last three presidents was taken
from Summary of Bills Vetoed, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
Legislation/Vetoes/vetoCounts.htm (click on the “Barack H. Obama,” “George W. Bush,” and
“William J. Clinton” table entries) (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
126
See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 38, at 595 n.7 (“On this view, Article V did not envisage any role
for a presidential signature or veto in the case of an amendment proposal emerging from a duly called
proposing convention; and an amendment proposal made by Congress should stand on the same
footing.”).
127
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. While amendment proposals passed by Congress are in the form of
joint resolutions, see supra note 110, amendment proposals passed by a convention could not take such
a form.
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is plainly wrong.128 It is wrong because absent explicit language to the
contrary, our constitutional democracy’s strong default presumption is one
of simple majority rule.129 Article V’s silence on the vote required in a
convention is not nearly enough to overcome this strong default
presumption. So too with presentment. Article V’s silence is not enough to
overcome the strong default presumption that all bicameral actions of
Congress (except adjournment) must be presented to the President.130 The
argument from symmetry thus fails even on its own terms.131
4. Other Implied Exceptions in the Constitution.—The Constitution
may well justify some implied exceptions, but Article V and presentment
are easily distinguishable from these situations. For example, the President
has long been able to make recess appointments of federal judges that
“shall expire at the End of [the Senate’s] next session”132 even though
Article III makes clear that all federal judges shall have life tenure.133 Even
Supreme Court Justices have been appointed during Senate recesses:
President Washington appointed John Rutledge to serve as Chief Justice
during a Senate recess in 1795, and President Eisenhower named Chief
Justice Warren, along with Justices Brennan and Stewart, to the Court
through recess appointments.134 In all cases but Rutledge’s, the Justices
128
See Note, Proposed Legislation on the Convention Method of Amending the United States
Constitution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1612, 1633–34 (1972).
129
See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892) (“[T]he general rule of all parliamentary
bodies is that, when a quorum is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the body. This
has been the rule for all time, except so far as in any given case the terms of the organic act under which
the body is assembled have prescribed specific limitations. . . . No such limitation is found in the
Federal Constitution, and therefore the general law of such bodies obtains.”); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 141 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1868) (“A simple majority of a
quorum is sufficient, unless the constitution establishes some other rule . . . .”).
130
Indeed, applying a consistent and reasonable textual approach, one must also conclude that the
calling of the convention itself—as a bicameral action of Congress—would require presentment. See
Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 206
(1972) (“The exclusion of the President from the process of calling a convention is flatly and obviously
unconstitutional under Article I, Section 7 . . . .”). Similarly, a consistent and reasonable textual
approach would also require Congress to repeal proposed amendments by a two-thirds majority. See
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the TwentySeventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 683 (1993).
131
The argument from symmetry has been invoked in other situations—for example, to argue
against congressional promulgation of amendments. See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of
Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 399–400 (1983).
132
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their
next Session.”).
133
See id. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”).
134
See LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31112, RECESS APPOINTMENTS OF FEDERAL
JUDGES 14–15 (2001).
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were subsequently renominated and confirmed by the Senate, mooting the
constitutional dilemma.135 At any rate, the implied exception to the lifetenure requirement, unlike the Article V situation, has a plausible textual
justification: the clause immediately preceding the Recess Appointment
Clause specifically lists “Judges of the supreme Court” among the officials
that the President may appoint.136 The Recess Appointments Clause and
Article III thus squarely conflict, leaving only two possible resolutions:
either the Clause is an implicit exception to Article III or “Judges of the
supreme Court” are implicit exceptions to the President’s recess
appointment power. Either choice requires finding an exception to a rule,
making this case closer to an express rather than a purely implied
exception.137 Article V has no such textual justification.
Applying the Presentment Clause to Article V does not present the
normative difficulties that accompany another implied exception in the
Constitution: the (in)ability of the Vice President to preside over his own
impeachment proceedings. Article I, Section 3 provides that “[t]he Vice
President of the United States shall be President of the Senate.”138 Section 3
goes on to provide that “[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments. . . . When the President of the United States is tried, the
Chief Justice shall preside . . . .”139 Put differently, the Vice President
presides over all Senate activities except for presidential impeachment
proceedings. And because the Framers explicitly listed this one exception
to the general rule, they must have intended this to be the only exception.140
Indeed, this exception closely mirrors the Presentment Clause’s
adjournment exception. Yet nobody could seriously contend that the Vice
President should preside over his own impeachment trial.141 Normative
concerns dictate this conclusion: the impartiality and fairness of a trial
would be compromised if the presiding officer were the one standing
accused.142 Allowing a member of the Executive Branch to preside over his
135

Id. at 14–16. Washington renominated Rutledge after the Senate reconvened, but the Senate
defeated the nomination and Rutledge resigned his recess appointment commission (after a failed
suicide attempt). Id. at 14–15.
136
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
137
See, e.g., Diana Gribbon Motz, The Constitutionality and Advisability of Recess Appointments
of Article III Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1666–67 (2011). Of course, as Judge Motz argues, the text
alone cannot tell us which is the exception and which is the rule. Id.
138
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
139
Id. cl. 6.
140
See, e.g., SUTHERLAND, supra note 95.
141
See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial?: A
Critique of Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 849 (2000). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 245 (1997) (contending that the Vice
President should preside over his own impeachment trial).
142
These normative concerns are reminiscent of those implicated by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which requires a neutral adjudicator to preside over trials. See, e.g., Borough of
Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2505 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
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own impeachment proceedings could also arguably violate the
constitutionally mandated separation of powers.143 That is why an implied
exception to the general rule of the Vice President’s senatorial powers is
warranted in the case of his own impeachment proceedings. But none of
these concerns apply to the presentment of amendment proposals. As
described in Part III, infra, normative and structural concerns actually
militate in favor of not finding an exception.
In sum, the plain text of the Constitution requires presentment of
amendments passed under Article V because all bicameral congressional
action is subject to the presentment requirement. Indeed, at least two other
state supreme courts that faced nearly identical textual provisions—those of
Wyoming144 and Montana145—interpreted their respective constitutions to

dissenting in part) (recognizing “the due process right to a neutral adjudicator”). This is not to say,
however, that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to impeachment proceedings. Cf.
Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Federal Impeachment and Criminal Procedure: The Framers’ Intent, 52 MD. L.
REV. 437, 454 (1993) (noting that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial does not apply to
impeachment proceedings).
143
Impeachment proceedings are constitutionally committed to the Legislative Branch. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. Whether the Vice President could preside over the impeachment trial of a lower
federal executive official is an interesting constitutional question that has neither arisen nor been
resolved. Only one nonpresidential executive officer has been impeached: War Secretary William
Belknap in 1876. See Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a
Madisonian Device, 49 DUKE L.J. 1, 44, 53 (1999). But the vice presidency was vacant at the time, Vice
President of the United States (President of the Senate), U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) (noting that Vice
President Henry Wilson “died in office on November 22, 1875; vice presidency remained vacant until
1877”), and so the President pro tempore of the Senate presided over Belknap’s impeachment
proceedings, see EXTRACTS FROM THE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN ALL CASES OF
IMPEACHMENT PRESENTED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1798–1904, S. DOC. NO. 62–876, at
329 (1912) (noting that the “President of the Senate pro tempore” was presiding). Belknap’s
impeachment proceedings are of dubious precedential value for another reason: he had already
resigned, causing many Senators to conclude that the Senate lacked jurisdiction over the case. Michael
J. Broyde & Robert A. Schapiro, Impeachment and Accountability: The Case of the First Lady,
15 CONST. COMMENT. 479, 488–90 (1998).
144
See Geringer v. Bebout, 10 P.3d 514, 521 (Wyo. 2000). Article 20, section 1 of the Wyoming
Constitution specifies the procedure for enacting constitutional amendments but, like Article V of the
U.S. Constitution, makes no mention of presentment. Id. at 520. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that
“[t]he language of Art. 3, § 41 [with language nearly identical to that of Art. I, § 7, cl. 3 of the U.S.
Constitution] is broad and inclusive, using the words ‘every order, resolution or vote.’ We are confident
that this language encompasses a vote to propose a constitutional amendment.” Id. at 521.
145
See State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray, 354 P.2d 552, 556 (Mont. 1960). At the time,
article XIX, section 9 of the Montana Constitution, like Article V of the U.S. Constitution, specified the
procedure for enacting constitutional amendments but made no mention of presentment. Id. at 556–57.
Article V, section 40 had language nearly identical to that of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 of the U.S.
Constitution, requiring that “[e]very order, resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both houses
may be necessary” must “be presented to the governor.” Id. at 556. The Montana Supreme Court held
that constitutional amendments must be presented to the governor because article V, section 40 “means
just what it says . . . . [It] is clear, certain, direct and unambiguous, and in the English language; it
speaks for itself; it needs no interpretation . . . .” Id. Today, however, Montana’s constitution excludes
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require gubernatorial presentment of state constitutional amendments.146
Arguments to the contrary tend to prove too much, for they would
eviscerate the presentment requirement for nearly all congressional action
if taken to their logical conclusions.
III. PRESENTMENT SHOULD APPLY AS A NORMATIVE MATTER
Normative concerns bolster the textual argument that constitutional
amendment proposals must be presented to the President for approval or
veto. Presentment would preserve the structural balance and separation of
powers, keeping alive the vital checks and balances crucial to our system. It
would also ensure that the President, one of two officials elected by a
nationwide vote, has an official say in the Republic’s most important
lawmaking process.
Presentment of amendments is important from a structural perspective.
The President is involved in legislation of far less importance147 than
constitutional amendments. This is by design: the Framers did not want
Congress to be able to act alone and completely bypass the Executive
Branch. Rather, they envisioned the presidential veto as a necessary check
on the Legislative Branch:
[T]he power in question . . . furnishes an additional security against the
enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative
body calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction,
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may
happen to influence a majority of that body.148

Furthermore, the Framers specifically thought that the veto power was
necessary for ensuring a proper separation of powers between the branches:

from this requirement “bills proposing amendments to the Montana constitution” and “bills ratifying
proposed amendments to the United States constitution.” MONT. CONST. art. 6, § 10, cl. 1.
146
Although not directly on point, it is curious to note that the Confederate States of America
(CSA), who largely adopted the U.S. Constitution when drafting their own, chose to modify Article V
to eliminate the dilemma altogether:
Upon the demand of any three States, legally assembled in their several conventions, the
Congress shall summon a convention of all the States, to take into consideration such
amendments to the Constitution as the said States shall concur in suggesting at the time when
the said demand is made: and should any of the proposed amendments to the Constitution be
agreed on by the said convention—voting by States—and the same be ratified by the
Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, or by conventions in two-thirds thereof—as the
one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the general convention, they shall
thenceforward form a part of this Constitution.
CONFEDERATE STATES OF AM. CONST. art. V, § 1, cl. 1. That is, the CSA eliminated the congressionalproposal option for amendments and only retained the convention option—an option that the Union had
not (and still has not) used.
147
“[I]nfinitely less importance,” in the words of Tilghman and Rawle. Hollingsworth v. Virginia,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 379 (1798) (argument of petitioner Hollingsworth’s attorneys).
148
THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 37, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton).
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The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights and
to absorb the powers of the other departments, has been already suggested
and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the
boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon; and the necessity of
furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defence, has been
inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable principles results the
propriety of a negative, either absolute or qualified, in the executive, upon
the acts of the legislative branches. Without the one or the other the former
would be absolutely unable to defend himself against the depredations of the
latter. He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive
resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the
other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be
blended in the same hands.149

The veto power was (and is) the most powerful tool available to the
President to defend himself against legislative encroachment and to prevent
legislative and executive powers from becoming “blended in the same
hands.”150
All of these arguments apply with equal force to constitutional
amendments. If anything, they carry even more force. Normal legislation
can always be repealed by simple majorities in subsequent congressional
sessions; constitutional amendments cannot.151 So there is an even greater
need for the President “to guard the community against the effects of
faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good.”152
What is more, the entire notion of separation of powers is constitutional in
nature; no statute defines our system of checks and balances.153 So the only
way to change the balance of power between the branches is to amend the
Constitution. How odd, then, if this were the one area in which the
President lacks the veto power, rendering him powerless to defend the
Executive Branch from the only method capable of permanently disabling
it.154 The entire structure of our federal government thus militates in favor
of a presidential role in the amendment process.
It is no answer that constitutional amendments are ultimately ratified
by the states, thereby providing the necessary check on Congress. As a
structural matter, states are best poised to “focus on the unique impact that

149

Id. at 494 (footnote omitted).
Id.
151
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment).
152
THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 37, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton).
153
See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 99–102 (1995) (arguing
that “[t]he separation-of-powers protections are, in fact, explicitly embodied in the [constitutional]
text”).
154
But see Note, supra note 128, at 1623 (finding it reasonable to exclude the President from the
amendment process because his veto is only meant to protect incursions on the Executive Branch by
Congress, not by the states).
150
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a problem may have in a particular geographical or economic area,”155 not
to defend the powers of the President or the federal Executive Branch. “By
dividing power on a vertical as well as lateral plane (that is, between the
state and federal governments), [the Framers] sought to assure that not all
policy decisions would be made at one political level.”156 In other words,
each branch of government (including the states) was expected to be in
tension with the others. Indeed, the Framers were likely more concerned
with the tensions between the federal government and the states than
between the branches of the as-yet undefined federal government.157 So
relying on states—themselves competing “branches” of the federalist
constitutional structure—to police the potential aggrandizement of
Congress at the expense of the President is akin to having the fox guard the
henhouse. State ratification of constitutional amendments is a structural
protection that is in addition to, not instead of, a presidential veto power.
Another normative reason supporting presidential involvement in the
amendment process is that the President is the only government official
who is elected on a nationwide basis, other than the Vice President.158
Congressmen represent their own districts, Senators their own states.159
Only the President, accountable to all American citizens, brings a
nationwide perspective that rises above the more provincial concerns of
individual congressmen.160 As discussed earlier, a presidential veto of
normal legislation induces changes in the vote tallies in Congress.161 This
effect would presumably be amplified in the case of a constitutional
amendment, where the stakes are much higher. The President’s nationwide
voice is an important and valuable contribution to the political dialogue.
One objection may be that the President is perfectly capable of lending
his voice to the dialogue even without a formal veto. As the de facto leader
of his political party, the President is likely to have influence over
constitutional amendment proposals as they wend their way through
Congress. And later on, the President’s public statements would likely
influence the various state legislatures who would have to ratify these
amendments. But this objection fails to consider political accountability.
An official veto demonstrates a type of transparent “political commitment”
155

REDISH, supra note 153, at 25 (describing the American federalist structure).
Id. at 4.
157
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 37, at 318–22 (James Madison) (discussing “the
disposition, and the faculty” that the federal and state governments have “to resist and frustrate the
measures of each other,” and listing ways in which the tension could be minimized).
158
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3 (describing the selection of Congressmen and Senators),
with id. art. II, § 1 (providing for the election of the President). See also id. amend. XII (modifying the
procedure to elect the Vice President); id. amend. XVII (calling for direct election of Senators).
159
See id. art. I, §§ 2–3; id. amend. XVII.
160
See, e.g., The FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 37, at 318 (James Madison) (“[T]he members of
the Federal Legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects.”).
161
See supra Part II.C.
156
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that is essential to our democracy.162 Public statements and the bully pulpit
are, to be sure, effective weapons in the President’s arsenal, but nothing
speaks louder than an official endorsement (signature) or rejection (veto) of
congressional action. After all, the White House has always made its views
on pending legislation known—and yet, as described earlier, congressional
vote tallies are almost never the same before and after an official
presidential veto.163
Another normative objection to presidential involvement is that the
Constitution is already devilishly difficult to amend; adding a presidential
veto will only make it worse. This is true. But it is of no matter. A
constitution that is relatively difficult to amend minimizes the chance that
the fleeting whims of a transient supermajority become constitutionalized
and thereby bind future generations.164 That is not to say that all methods of
increasing the difficulty of amending the Constitution are desirable. For
example, simply increasing the required supermajority in Congress to, say,
three-fourths or four-fifths (or nine-tenths) would be one way to protect
future generations from such fleeting whims. But such a scheme would
allow small congressional minorities or fringe groups to hijack the
amendment process, perhaps making the Constitution virtually impossible
to amend.165 That sort of obstacle to the amendment process would be
normatively undesirable.
Adding the President to the process is an obstacle of a different kind.
Being nationally elected, the President is far less likely to fall captive to
parochial interests or to narrow fringe groups than a small group of
congressmen or Senators.166 What is more, the mere possibility of a
presidential veto would ensure that Congress would craft its amendment
proposals to respect the Executive Branch, which in turn would ensure that

162

The political commitment principle, in the context of legislative action, is described in REDISH,
supra note 153, at 137, 157–61. See also Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative
Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of
United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 451–53 (2006). The colloquial equivalent would be
“putting one’s money where one’s mouth is.”
163
See supra Part II.C.
164
See AMAR, supra note 38, at 287–89 (reviewing various state constitutional amendment
procedures rejected by the Framers as models for Article V, including several (such as South
Carolina’s) that were more easily amendable). Of course, even Article V is not foolproof against the
fleeting whims of transient supermajorities. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed).
165
The requirement of unanimity to amend the Articles of Confederation was one feature the
Framers specifically wished to relax. Madison summarized the view as stated by Hamilton: “It had been
wished by many and was much to have been desired that an easier mode for introducing amendments
had been provided by the articles of Confederation.” MADISON, supra note 84, at 609 (footnotes
omitted).
166
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2311 & n.261 (2001)
(noting “past Presidents’ relative lack of partisanship” due to “the incentives provided by a national
constituency”).
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due thought goes into the proposals.167 In sum, any increased difficulty in
amending the Constitution as a result of presidential involvement is a good
kind of difficulty, one we should eagerly embrace.
IV. IS THE CONSTITUTION UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Despite the textual and normative reasons for enforcing a presentment
requirement for amendments, in light of clearly settled law, reinstating the
presentment requirement for Article V amendments would likely require a
new constitutional amendment. This is because there are only two
interpretations: either the Constitution requires presentment of amendments
or it does not.168 The latter interpretation (the one adopted to varying
degrees by all three branches of government) means that although virtually
all congressional action requires presentment, the most important
congressional act—proposing constitutional amendments—does not. The
former interpretation, which I advocate, potentially means that all previous
amendments (except the Thirteenth) were unconstitutionally enacted and
are therefore void. This is a disturbing proposition, admittedly at odds with
the interpretive technique of allowing long-standing practice to fix the
meaning of constitutional text.169
But a new constitutional amendment would be a curious way to restore
Article V’s textual, structural, and normatively desirable meaning. Is there
any way to require presentment for future amendments without nullifying
all of the previous ones? One possible solution is to adopt broad definitions
of “presentment” and “approval” such that simple transmittal to the
President of a copy of the amendment suffices for the former and the
President’s failure to return an amendment to Congress with his objections
suffices for the latter. Under this approach, all twenty-seven amendments
have in fact been presented and approved. We can thus adopt a presentment
requirement for future amendments while allowing previously enacted
amendments to remain settled and valid law.170

167

“Article V sensibly required Congress to get outside approval, a requirement that would deter
many self-aggrandizing amendments from even being proposed and would prevent other ill-advised
schemes from being adopted.” AMAR, supra note 38, at 290. Although Professor Amar is referring to
the states giving “outside approval,” his reasoning applies with equal force to the President, in
particular when the “self-aggrandizing amendments” come at the expense of the Executive Branch.
168
See SCALIA, supra note 76, at 40 (embracing “the rule that a text does not change” over time
because the Constitution’s “whole purpose is to prevent change”).
169
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“[C]ontemporaneous legislative
exposition of the Constitution . . . , acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be
given its provisions.”); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (“Long settled and established
practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this
character.”).
170
Another “solution” is to invoke stare decisis to treat the existing twenty-seven amendments as
validly enacted and of continued prospective legal force, while simultaneously adopting the textually
correct interpretation presented here for any future amendment proposals. See SCALIA, supra note 76, at

992

107:963 (2013)

The President’s Role in Constitutional Amendment

As discussed in Part II, amendments are passed as joint resolutions,171
and resolutions (along with orders and votes) need only be “approved” by
the President, not signed.172 Conversely, presidential disapproval, even for
an order, resolution, or vote, requires an affirmative act—that is, the
President must return the parchment or copy to Congress listing the
objections.173 These two provisions combine to yield a strong default
presumption in favor of finding presidential approval, a presumption
overcome only by clear evidence to the contrary.
Lending further credence to this default presumption is that the
Constitution permits legislation passed by Congress to automatically
become law in the face of presidential inaction, as long as Congress
remains in session for ten days following its passage.174 This reinforces the
notion that only affirmative steps on the part of the President to return a
bill, order, resolution, or vote to Congress can constitute disapproval.
Furthermore, the definition of “presented” can be interpreted broadly to
simply mean the physical act of transmitting a parchment or copy of the
amendment to the President. This was precisely what Senator Howe said in
the February 7, 1865 Senate debate:
[T]he resolution now pending declares that it was unnecessary to present [the
amendment] to [the President]. I do not think that follows, even if the
premises are as stated; for if it had not been presented to the President, I ask
you, sir, and I ask the Senate, how would it have been transmitted to the
Legislatures of the States? . . . It would not go to the State Department unless
presented to the President.175

Under this definition, all previous amendments have been presented to the
President for the simple reason that Congress has always asked the
139 (“The whole function of the doctrine [of stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false under
proper analysis must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of stability.”).
A principled justification for such an approach is that once a constitutional amendment is ratified by
the requisite number of states, all pre-ratification defects are cured. Under this view, the salient feature
of constitutional amendments is that they are ratified by the states (either legislatures or conventions
therein). So once three-fourths of the states ratify an amendment, it becomes constitutionally valid
irrespective of any constitutional defects in the proposal process. This state-centric view of amendment
ratification is bolstered by the fact that amendments can also be proposed by the states themselves at a
national convention with no federal involvement whatsoever (other than for Congress to perform its
mandatory and ministerial duty to call the convention). U.S. CONST. art. V. While undoubtedly
problematic as a textual matter, such an approach might be justifiable from a federalist standpoint: if the
Constitution is a compact among states, then it would make sense that states are the ultimate arbiters of
what is and is not a part of the Constitution. But see U.S. CONST. pmbl. (stating that “We the People,”
and not the states, are the sovereign bodies forming the Constitution).
171
See Constitutional Amendment Process, supra note 110 (noting that amendments are proposed
by joint resolution).
172
See supra Part II.A.
173
See supra Part II.A.
174
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
175
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 630 (1865).

993

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Executive Branch to distribute amendment proposals to the various
states.176
Because no President has ever returned an amendment proposal to
Congress, these broad definitions of presentment and approval would save
all but two sets of amendments. Table 1 lists for each amendment its
proposal date, the last date of the proposing congressional session, and the
number of days in between proposal and recess or adjournment.177
TABLE 1: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
Amendment

Date Proposed

Last Date of Session

No. Days

1–10; 27

9/25/1789

9/29/1789

4

11

3/4/1794

6/9/1794

97

12

12/9/1803

3/27/1804

109

13

1/31/1865

3/3/1865

31

14

6/13/1866

7/28/1866

45

15

2/26/1869

3/3/1869

5

16

7/12/1909

8/5/1909

24

17

5/13/1912

8/26/1912

105

18

12/18/1917

12/18/1917

0

19

6/4/1919

7/1/1919

27

20

3/2/1932

7/16/1932

136

21

2/20/1933

3/3/1933

11

22

3/21/1947

7/27/1947

128

176
What is more, all joint resolutions—which include constitutional amendments, see supra note
110—that pass both Houses must by law be printed, “signed by the presiding officers of both Houses
and sent to the President of the United States.” 1 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). Section 106 was originally
enacted in 1947, 61 Stat. 634 (1947), as part of an “ambitious” program to “enact[] into positive
law . . . all the titles of the United States Code,” H.R. REP. NO. 80-251, at 2 (1947). But the reenactment
into positive law was to be “without any material change” in the substantive law, id. (emphasis added),
and so the requirement that all joint resolutions be presented to the President must have predated the
enactment of § 106. Congress, at least, considered § 106 to be the reenactment—“without any material
change”—of a resolution originally passed in 1893 and amended in 1895. Id. at 5–6.
177
Proposal dates are from HUCKABEE, supra note 44, at 4 tbl.1. Congressional session dates are
from PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, 1789–1988, S. Pub. 102-12, at x–xxvi tbl.2 (1992).
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Amendment

Date Proposed

Last Date of Session

No. Days

23

6/17/1960

7/3/1960

16

24

8/27/1962

10/13/1962

47

25

7/6/1965

10/23/1965

109

26

3/23/1971

4/7/1971

15

Only the Bill of Rights (including the Twenty-Seventh Amendment),
the Fifteenth Amendment, and the Eighteenth Amendment passed both
houses of Congress within ten days of a congressional recess or
adjournment, thereby requiring some further evidence of “approv[al]” to
legitimize.
The case of the Eighteenth Amendment is obviously moot.178 As for
the Bill of Rights, Congress undoubtedly presented it to President
Washington for distribution to the states.179 Washington had already
indicated his approval of whatever amendments Congress chose to
propose180 and did not “disapprove” of them. Indeed, Washington explicitly
recognized the urgency and desirability of amending the Constitution:
In his First Inaugural Address, President Washington went out of his way to
mention that suitably drafted amendments might answer various “objections
which have been urged against” the Constitution and thereby reduce
skeptics’ “inquietude.” . . . Washington devoted more than 10 percent of his
brief address to the topic of amendments, advising Congress to consider
whether the new Constitution might be revised so as to “impregnably
fortif[y]” the “characteristic rights of freemen” without “endanger[ing] the
benefits of an united and effective government.”181

To be sure, Washington delivered these remarks well before Congress
passed the amendment proposals. But his post-passage actions were fully
consistent with his inaugural address: Washington promptly sent copies of

178

See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (“The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of
the United States is hereby repealed.”).
179
See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 948 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (“On motion, it was resolved, that
the President of the United States be requested to transmit to the Executives of the several States which
have ratified the Constitution, copies of the amendments proposed by Congress, to be added thereto,
and like copies to the Executives of the States of Rhode Island and North Carolina.”); S. JOURNAL, 1st
Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1789) (Senate concurring in the resolution).
180
See Washington, supra note 8; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
181
AMAR, supra note 38, at 318 (alterations in original). Professor Amar notes in the quoted
passage that because of Washington’s role “as president[,] he had no official part to play in the
amendment process,” citing Hollingsworth. Id. at 318, 594–95 n.7.
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the amendments to the states, which strongly suggests that he indeed
“approved” of them.182
The Fifteenth Amendment was passed just five days before Congress
adjourned, and, unlike Washington with the Bill of Rights, President
Andrew Johnson may not have fully supported its enactment.183
Nevertheless, President Johnson promptly delivered copies of the Fifteenth
Amendment (as he did with the Fourteenth) to the states within days of its
passage,184 perhaps waiving any right to a pocket veto.185
A natural objection to the preceding analysis is that if “presentment”
and “approval” can be so loosely defined, then why bother changing the
interpretation of Article V? After all, if the path traveled by the first
twenty-seven amendment proposals was constitutionally sufficient under
these broad definitions, then why change practices now? The answer, of
course, lies in the normative justifications for an increased presidential role:
a more robust separation of powers, the importance of constitutional
amendments vis-à-vis normal legislation, the uniquely nationwide
perspective that the President lends to the process, and the importance of a
presidential “political commitment.”186 These reasons do not apply with the
same force to previously enacted amendments that are part of settled law.
More to the point, none of these normative goals would be furthered by
invalidating previously enacted amendments. That is why it makes
182
Because President Washington so clearly approved of the Bill of Rights, perhaps even the
National Archives can be forgiven the error of assuming that “President George Washington signed this
resolution on October 2, 1789 and forwarded copies to the 11 states that had ratified the U.S.
Constitution [and also to] Rhode Island and North Carolina . . . .” Press Release, Nat’l Archives, The
National Archives Presents the ORIGINAL Bill of Rights—with 12 Amendments! (Dec. 7, 2010)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.preview.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2011/nr1121.html.
183
Because President Johnson opposed the Fourteenth Amendment and the Reconstruction Acts, it
stands to reason that he did not support the Fifteenth Amendment either. See supra Part I.C.
184
President Johnson must have sent the copies immediately, because the first state to ratify the
Fifteenth Amendment, Nevada, did so on March 1, just three days after Congress passed the
amendment. ROBERT BRADY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMENDED, H.R. DOC.
NO. 110-50, at 18 (2007). Furthermore, President Ulysses S. Grant, who took office on March 4—well
within the ten-day window—clearly approved of the amendment; after the Fifteenth Amendment was
ratified, President Grant took the “unusual” step of “notify[ing] the two Houses of Congress . . . of the
ratification of a constitutional amendment,” because “of the vast importance of the fifteenth
amendment” whose adoption “completes the greatest civil change and constitutes the most important
event that has occurred since the nation came into life.” Ulysses S. Grant, Message to the Senate and
House of Representatives (Mar. 30, 1870), in 7 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 55, 55–56 (James D. Richardson ed., 1898).
185
In The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 677 (1929), the Supreme Court emphasized that the
reason for a strict ten-day window is to give the President enough time to “carefully examine and
consider a bill and determine, after due deliberation, whether he should approve or disapprove it.” In
this case, because President Johnson examined the joint resolution and promulgated it to the states
sometime before March 1, he had already concluded his “due deliberation,” rendering Congress’s
March 3 adjournment moot.
186
See supra Part III.
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normative sense to apply the presentment requirement prospectively but not
retroactively.
CONCLUSION
Despite the clear textual, structural, and normative reasons that dictate
presentment of constitutional amendment proposals, all three branches of
government have eventually adopted or acquiesced in a practice of
sidestepping the President. Given this extensive history, the issue must be
treated as settled law. That said, I have offered a theoretical perspective to
restore the proper meaning and practice for future amendments without
invalidating the existing twenty-seven.
But requiring that future constitutional amendment proposals be
presented to the President raises another question: Who will enforce the
requirement? In theory, the Supreme Court could enforce the requirement
ex post if someone challenged an amendment’s validity.187 But given the
precedent of Hollingsworth (and the reiteration of Hollingsworth’s holding
in INS v. Chadha), the Supreme Court is unlikely to do so.
A surer way would be for the President to take the initiative, either by
signing or vetoing constitutional amendment proposals that land on the
Oval Office’s desk. Although a signature is not necessary to denote
approval, signing an amendment proposal would be a symbolic way for the
President to signal an official role in the process. It is hard to imagine that
the Supreme Court would object to a presidential signature on a
constitutional amendment (even assuming someone could be found with
standing to litigate the issue), especially given the precedent of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
More dramatically, the President could veto an amendment proposal.
The Court would likely refrain from interfering in this situation as well.
Even assuming someone could be found with standing to challenge such a
veto, this would seem to present a classic political question: “[T]he
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government”—
here, the Executive Branch—is self-evident.188 In this way, the President
could act unilaterally to reclaim the Executive’s rightful role in the
187
See Note, supra note 128, at 1622 (“[T]he courts, the government branch primarily responsible
for constitutional interpretation and protection, will not give effect to amendments which have not
satisfied the requirements of article V.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 1642 (“Once a controversy
was within the general jurisdiction of a federal court, it would determine the validity of the amendment
involved. Since a court cannot be made to apply a rule of law which it finds to be unconstitutional,
congressional attempts to exclude judicial review of an amendment’s validity would be to no avail.”
(footnote omitted)).
188
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 457 (1939)
(Black, J., concurring) (“[W]hether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination
of ratification conforms to the commands of the Constitution, calls for decisions by a ‘political
department’ of questions of a type which this Court has frequently designated ‘political.’”).
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constitutional amendment process. Upon reflection, it appears that Herman
Cain’s “grasp of the Constitution” is quite firm—perhaps even
(unwittingly) sophisticated—after all.
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